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Effect of attenuation and dispersion in the communication channel
on the secrecy of a quantum cryptosystem
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Institute of Solid State Physics, Chernogolovka, 142432 Russia
Abstract
The effects of dispersion in the communication channel on the secrecy of a quantum
cryptosystem based on single photon states with different frequencies are studied. A
maximum communication channel length which can still ensure the secrecy of the key
generation procedure is found.
PACS numbers: 03.65.Bz, 89.70.+c, 42.50.Wm
The main purpose of cryptography is to allow the exchange of secret information among
two or more legitimate users. The basic element of every cryptosystem is the key, i.e. a random
sequence of units and zeros used to code the messages [1]. The communication can be shown
to be absolutely secret if the key length equals the message length and the key is used only
once [2]. Therefore, the major task is to ensure the secrecy of the key distribution procedure
among the legitimate users. In the standard cryptosystem there is no fundamental principle
which could guarantee the detection of any eavesdropping attempt at the key distribution stage;
thus the cryptosystem secrecy is based on the key complexity rather than fundamental laws of
nature [1].
On the other hand, quantum cryptography provides a key distribution procedures where
the possibility of detecting any eavesdropping attempt is guaranteed by the fundamental laws
of quantum mechanics.
As a rule, the secrecy of quantum cryptosystems is proved for ideal communication channels.
However, the imperfections of a communication channel should generally reduce the secrecy of
the key generation procedure so that any practical cryptosystem should carefully take into
account the actual properties of the communication channel employed.
Recently, several new quantum cryptosystems have been proposed [3–9]. One of these
systems, based on phase coding and employing a 30 km long fiber line as an interferometer arm
has been realized experimentally [9].
In the paper [10] a quantum cryptosystem based on the EPR (Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen)
effect for biphoton states has been proposed. Actually, a similar scheme can be implemented
with single-photon states, which is much simpler from the experimental point of view since
it does not involve generation of biphoton states (e.g., with the parametric down-conversion).
In addition, such a scheme should be much more stable, since it does not employ a long-arm
interferometer.
The secrecy of this cryptosystem (detection of eavesdropping attempts) is based on the
fundamental time–energy uncertainty relation. The scheme proposed in [10] did not take into
account attenuation and dispersion in the communication channel which could severely hamper
its practical realization. The purpose of the present paper is to find out the conditions under
which it is possible to ensure the secrecy of the cryptosystem in the presence of attenuation
and dispersion.
Let us first describe the key generation procedure which does not involve the biphoton states.
The user A sends at random into the communication channel (optical fiber) to user B on of
the following three single-photon states: one of the two states with narrow frequency spectra
centered around well defined frequencies ω1 and ω2 (frequency spectra widths σ1, σ2 ≪ |ω1−ω2|)
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or a well localized in time (correspondingly, with a wide frequency spectrum of width σ
∞
) at a
carry frequency ω0 ≈ ω1,2. Actually, the optical fiber transparency window corresponds to the
wavelength λ ≈ 1.3 µm (frequencies ω0,1,2 ≈ 1015 s−1).
According to the fundamental time–energy uncertainty relation, sending a signal with a
well-defined frequency ω1 or ω2 means that the moments of times when the photon leaves user
A (tA) and is registered by user B (tB) exhibit a large scatter ∆tA,B ≥ 1/σ1,2.
If a broad-spectrum photon is emitted, although the associated uncertainty in frequency
σ
∞
is large, the corresponding state can be prepared rather fast and the photon emission and
detection times can be measured with high accuracy (∆t ≈ 1/σ
∞
→ 0 if σ
∞
→∞).
To register a photon, user B choses randomly and independently of user A in each mea-
surement either one of the narrow-band photodetectors with central frequencies ω1 and ω2 and
bandwidths γ1,2 ≈ σ1,2, or a wide-band photodetector with the central frequency ω0 and band-
width γ
∞
≈ σ
∞
. The frequency separation δω12 = |ω1 − ω2| should not be less than the sum
σ1 + σ2 if the photons with frequencies ω1 and ω2 should be distinguished. For a gaussian
spectrum the inequality δω12 > 3(σ1 + σ2) is sufficient.
Measurements with a narrow-band photodetector allow to distinguish between ω1 and ω2,
but they cannot be performed in a time shorter than 1/δω12 (the same is also true for the
minimal time required to prepare these states).
Measurements with a wide-band photodetector can be completed during the time interval
∆t
∞
≈ 1/σ
∞
→ 0, but they cannot determine the photon energy with the accuracy better than
σ
∞
. Users A and B choose the cryptosystem parameters to satisfy the inequality
∆t
∞
≪ ∆t12. (1)
After a series of measurements user B announces through a public channel which type of
the photodetector (wide- or narrow-band) was used in each measurement, but does not disclose
which particular frequency ω1 or ω2) was used in the case of a narrow-band photodetector.
Those measurements where the photodetector did not fire or the photodetector type differed
from the type of the single-photon signal, are discarded. The remaining measurements where
narrow-band photodetectors were used yield a random sequence of zeros and units (ω1 corre-
sponds to zero and ω2 to unit) shared by the two users which can be used as a key. The prob-
ability of an error (e.g., obtaining zero instead of unit) is negligibly small if δω12 > 3(σ1 + σ2).
To correct the key one can use a privacy amplification scheme proposed by Bennett et al [11].
Measurements where short pulses were used (i.e., the photon emission and registration
times are known with high accuracy) allow to detect any eavesdropping attempt. For all
such measurements users A and B announce through a public channel the photon emission
(tA) and registration (tB) times. Then the expected delay time tA − tB = const (to within
∆t
∞
≈ 1/σ
∞
→ 0) is calculated from the known line length. Any systematic deviation of
tA− tb from the expected delay time means the presence of an eavesdropper. Indeed, to extract
the information about the key, the eavesdropper should be able to distinguish between ω1 and ω2
(0 or 1); therefore, he should employ narrow-band photodetectors. Such measurements (as well
as preparation of narrow-band signals centered around ω1 and ω2 to be sent by the eavesdropper
to user B) cannot be performed faster than in ∆t12 ≈ 1/δω12 ≫ ∆t∞. The eavesdropper will
unavoidably run into the situation where user A sent a short signal, while the eavesdropper uses
a narrow-band photodetector (since the user A chooses the type of signal he sends to user B at
random) and re-sends to user B a signal with a well-defined frequency. The eaves dropper must
re-send the photon to user B since otherwise this measurement will be discarded because the
photodetector would not fire. Therefore, a systematic deviation of tA − tB from the expected
delay time by not less than ∆t12 ≈ 1/δω12, which is much larger than the accuracy with which
the delay time tA − tB is known.
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Up to this moment we did not take into account attenuation and dispersion of the quantum
communication channel. Practically, a fiber cable is used as channel which implies that short
pulses sent by user A would experience broadening (signal width at the receiving end of the
line is expected to be enhanced) so that the scatter in the photon registration time by user B
is increased simplifying the task of the eavesdropper and reducing the cryptosystem security.
Our purpose is find out the relationships between the single-photon states parameters σ1,2,
δω1,2, σ∞, and the communication channel attenuation and dispersion which still allow a secret
key distribution procedure.
Let the user A prepare a single-photon state at the input of the communication channel
(point x = 0) with the spectral width σ (which is one of σ1,2,∞) and the carry frequency ω0 (for
definiteness we assume that ω0 = ω1,2, although this is not essential)
E(0, t) =
1
(piσ2)1/4
∫
∞
0
exp
{
−(ω − ω0)
2
2σ2
}
exp (−iωt)dω (2)
The effective pulse duration at the channel input is
(∆tA)
2 =
∫
∞
0
(t− t)2|E(0, t)|2dt = 1
2σ2
, (3)
t =
∫
∞
0
t|E(0, t)|2dt,
and its spectral width is
(∆ωA)
2 =
∫
∞
0
(ω − ω)2|E(0, ω)|2dω = σ2/2, (4)
ω =
∫
∞
0
ω|E(0, ω)|2dω,
E(0, ω) =
∫
∞
0
E(0, t) exp (iωt)dt
Actually, even for a short pulse with t ≈ 10−12 s the spectral width is relatively small (carry
frequency ω0 ≈ 1015 s−1), so that only quadratic terms can be retained in the expansion of the
wavevector as a function of frequency [12,13]:
k(ω) = k0 + α(ω − ω0) + β(ω − ω0)2, (5)
where α and β are generally complex constants, their real and imaginary parts describing
dispersion and attenuation, respectively. Let us first assume that the attenuation is absent.
The signal (2) at the point x (user B) takes the form
E(x, t) =
1
2
√
pi
1√
σ20 − iβx
exp
{
− (αx− t)
2
4(σ2
0
− iβx)
}
, σ2
0
=
1
2σ2
(6)
The field intensity observed by user B is
|E(x, t)|2 = 1
4pi(σ2
0
+ β2x2)
exp
{
−(αx− t)
2
2σ2(x)
}
, σ2(x) =
σ4
0
+ β2x2
2σ2
0
(7)
The effective spectral width of the signal at point x remains the same as at the channel input
(remember that the attenuation is not taken into account)
(∆ωA)
2 = (∆ωB)
2 =
∫
∞
0
(ω − ω)2|E(0, ω)|2dω =
∫
∞
0
(ω − ω)2|E(x, ω)|2dω (8)
3
The effective pulse duration at the receiving end of the channel is increased by a factor of
(1 + β2x2σ4)
(∆tB)
2 =
∫
∞
0
(t− t)2|E(x, t)|2dt = 1
2σ2(x)
=
1
2σ2
(1 + β2x2σ4), (9)
This time ∆tB is the mean time taken by the wave packet to pass through the point x, while
the inequality
∆ωB∆tB ≥
√
1 + β2x2σ4 (10)
is a variety of the Mandelstam–Tamm inequality [14]. Equation (10) describes the statistics
of (potential) measurements performed on a particle, rather than an actual measurement of
a photon observable so that it cannot be interpreted as a time–energy uncertainty relation
relevant to a real act of measurement (which is described by the Bohr uncertainty principle; see
a detailed discussion in the paper by Krylov and Fock [16]). We shall adhere to the orthodox
point of view assuming the time–energy uncertainty relation is a fundamental law of nature
(various point of view are discussed in a review article by Dodonov and Man’ko [17]). The
average time taken by the wave packet to pass through the point x has nothing to do with the
measurement time δt which is arbitrarily chosen by the experimentalist. The Bohr uncertainty
relation is applicable to a real act of measurement (e.g. passage of a particle through a device
shutter which unavoidably changes the particle energy in an uncontrollable way)
∆E∆t ≥ 1, (11)
where ∆E is the scatter of measured energy [17]. Unlike the Mandelstam-Tamm relation
which is derived from the evolution governed by the Schro¨dinger equation [14], the Bohr un-
certainty relation is actually a postulate since the measurement act cannot be described by the
Schro¨dinger equation.
Thus, to register a photon with the spectrum width σ
∞
user B should open the shutter for
a time interval at least (1 + β2x2σ4
∞
)1/2/σ
∞
long. Of course, user B could open the shutter for
arbitrarily short time, but in that case he would not be able to systematically detect a photon:
Although in some rare measurements he would still register a photon even if the shutter were
only open during δt → 0, the fraction of such measurements should tend to zero or otherwise
the Bohr time–energy uncertainty relation [15] would be violated.
Let us now find out when the quantum cryptosystem still remains secret, i.e. the scatter
in the short pulse registration times by user B ∆tB should be substantially less than the time
taken by the eavesdropper (at the location x somewhere between A and B) to register the
photon with a narrow-band photodetector, which, as described above, could not be shorter
than
∆tE ≥
(1 + β2x2Eσ
4
1,2)
1/2
δω12
(12)
The inequality
∆tB ≪ ∆tE (13)
imposes the following limit on the channel length:
(1 + β2x2σ4
∞
)1/2
σ
∞
≪ (1 + β
2x2Eσ
4
1,2)
1/2
δω12
(14)
The worst situation with respect to the system secrecy occurs if the eavesdropper is located close
to the user A (xE ≈ 0). In that case the eavesdropper is not affected by the pulse broadening.
4
Therefore, the maximum channel length is
xB ≤ 1
δω12σ∞β
(15)
Thus, the smaller is the frequency separation between the information-carrying signals ω1 and
ω2, the shorter is the reference pulse (the wider is its frequency spectrum), and the lower is
the dispersion quadratic coefficient, the larger is the allowed quantum communication channel
length still preserving the system secrecy. However, this inequality does not impose any absolute
restrictions on the channel length. Formally, the channel length can be made arbitrarily large
at the price of reducing the frequency separation δω12 = |ω1 − ω2|.
Let us now make some numerical estimates. For a frequency separation δω12 = |ω1 − ω2| ≈
109 Hz corresponding to the linewidth of a rather average semiconductor laser, the short pulse
duration of 1 ps (σ
∞
≈ 1012 Hz), and a typical quadratic dispersion coefficient β ≈ 1 ps2/km
[18], one has for the allowed channel length
xB ≤ 1
109 · 1012 · (10−12)2 [km] ≈ 10
3 km,
The role of attenuation reduces to the following two effects. First, the fraction of measure-
ments where the photodetector employed by user B did not fire is increased. This effect reduces
the system efficiency but does not affect its secrecy. The second effect is the renormalization
of dispersion. Now the restriction on the channel length becomes
(1 + σ2
∞
βimx)
2 + β2rex
2σ4
∞
(1 + σ2
∞
βimx)
2
≤ σ
2
∞
δω12
; (16)
for weak attenuation
xB ≤ 1√
β2im + β
2
reδω12σ∞
, (17)
where βre and βim are the real and imaginary parts of the dispersion quadratic coefficient.
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